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Genocide in Nigeria 2024: U.S. options to prevent it

Funeral for victims of a Boko Haram jihadist massacre credit: Al Jazeera


Genocide in Nigeria 2024

By Greg Stanton, Founding President, Genocide Watch

 

The Islamist genocide in Nigeria is now fifteen years old. Since 2012, Genocide Watch has issued Genocide Warnings for Nigeria because of Boko Haram, a terrorist group bent on genocide.  It has been the deadliest genocidal group in the world, with at least 27,000 murders.  Boko Haram has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State.

 

Since 2015, Genocide Watch has also said that Fulani militias have been carrying out "genocidal massacres." The term indicates killing based on identity, but without centralized organization. It is now clear that the Fulani jihad is organized. It is financed by large Fulani cattle owners with the support of Fulani in the Nigerian Army.

 

"Genocide," like that being committed by Boko Haram, requires organization. That's because of the Genocide Convention's requirement that the destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group must be "intentional."

 

The questions that have plagued the intent requirement is: intentional by whom? And how can you prove "intent?"  If a State or an organization like Boko Haram orders the genocide, it's possible to find intent two ways:

1. Orders from the leaders; or

2. A pattern of acts that show from their consequences that they are coordinated or connected by deliberate intent.

 

Boko Haram’s massacres are intentional genocide with orders from leaders. They also have a systematic pattern.

 

It is harder to prove that Fulani jihadist massacres are intentional genocide because:

·       Orders or policy statements from identifiable leaders have not been gathered.

·       Proof of coordination to show a systematic pattern of massacres has not been compiled.

 

Proving a coordinated, systematic pattern of massacres by Fulani jihadists

 

Fulani jihads spread Islam across northern Nigeria from 1804 - 1903, begun under Usman Dan Fodio of the Sokoto Caliphate.  Hausas, Kanuris, and other northern groups were forced to convert. There are now 25 million Fulani across West Africa, 15 million in Nigeria.

 

There is evidence that Fulani jihadism has been revived since 2015, and that Fulani militias are now in communication with Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).

 

Massacres by Fulani militias have killed over 17,000 Christians in Nigeria since 2015. That's why Genocide Watch calls them "genocidal massacres."  They target Christians, members of a religious group. 

 

Do Fulani militias have the organization necessary to prove “genocide”, with genocidal intent?

 

Only a well-organized, credible investigation will be able to prove that Fulani massacres constitute genocide.

 

Law enforcement agencies in Nigeria do not have an effective unit to investigate and prosecute Fulani militias. The International Criminal Court’s preliminary investigation of Boko Haram in 2013 resulted in no charges.  The ICC has not launched a similar investigation of Fulani jihadists or ISWAP.

 

The current dominant narrative: “Herder-Farmer conflict” = Denial 

 

Genocide deniers explain the massacres by Fulani Muslims against Christians as traditional herder-farmer “conflicts.” That is still the dominant narrative used by the US State Department and UK Foreign Office to “explain” these massacres. The "conflict" is blamed on "climate change," as the Sahel has been stricken by drought.

 

This narrative is the position of the US Ambassador to Nigeria, the State Department Africa Bureau, and the President of the American University in Nigeria. Unfortunately, they are wrong. Like Ambassador David Rawson in Rwanda in 1994, they seem to be unable to read the bloody handwriting on the church walls of Nigeria.

 

Conflict prevention organizations like The International Crisis Group, academic experts, and pacifist groups are fond of this narrative. So is the US Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Center for the Prevention of Genocide.

 

Since 2015, when Muhammadu Buhari became President, the massacres have become deadlier. Fulani militias use AK47’s and arrive in trucks with 100 or more armed killers. They burn and depopulate whole Christian villages. In 2022 they derailed a train and took 200 hostages. They have massacred hundreds of worshipers in churches.

 

Fulani massacres since 2015 have been part of a campaign to forcibly displace Christian farmers from their villages and land.  Emptied villages are declared Fulani Emirates and land ownership is transferred for Fulani cattle grazing. The Benue state governor’s order to prohibit free cattle grazing on farmland belonging to other ethnicities was ignored by Fulani herdsmen and reversed by President Buhari.

 

The Fulani cultural and ranching organization, Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) was headed by President Buhari, himself. He is Fulani. Military investors have purchased large herds of cattle that are tended by Fulani herdsmen. They pay for the weapons distributed to Fulani militias who carry out the massacres.

 

The current President of Nigeria, Bola Tinubu has a degree in accounting from Chicago State University. After working for Mobil Oil, he entered politics in Buhari’s party and was elected President in 2023. He has not persuaded the Nigerian Army to protect Christian villages and stop the massacres.

 

Is this “genocide” or simply “ethnic cleansing?”

 

A combination of genocidal massacres and forced displacement was the murderous methodology of the genocides in Bosnia, Kosovo, Darfur, and Myanmar.  Those genocides coupled with forced displacement were usually misnamed, using Slobodan Miloševiċ’s euphemism, “ethnic cleansing.”

 

There is no treaty or international convention that outlaws “ethnic cleansing.”  “Ethnic cleansing” is a term invented by Milošević for genocide denial.  As long as “ethnic cleansing” is the dominant term used to describe massacres, genocide risk analysts have shown that there will be no forceful intervention to stop the killing.[1]

 

When the dominant term in the press, UN, law reviews, and human rights reports changes to “genocide,” forceful action to stop the killing becomes possible. Calling the crime “genocide” makes a difference, as we showed with ISIS. Genocide is an action word.[2]

 

Genocide Watch considers "genocidal massacres" to be acts of genocide, and therefore "genocide." But lawyers with narrower concepts of intent don’t agree.  We need to prove coordination to prove “genocide”.

 

Foucher[3] claims that there is insufficient evidence that Presidents Buhari and Tinubu and the Nigerian Army support the Fulani massacres. Without solid proof, the strongest statement that can be made is that they have been "bystanders" to the Fulani genocide. The Nigerian government has not launched a program to stop the massacres.

 

We need to collect evidence of coordination by Fulani jihadist groups, and evidence of connections with Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa. The UN Human Rights Council should appoint an independent fact-finding mission on Nigeria to investigate. It could be led by the respected Bob Gersony.

 

Are the Nigerian government and Nigerian Army complicit in these massacres?

 

Fulani jihadists, Boko Haram, and the Islamic State in West Africa are now carrying out massacres across the Sahel, in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Sudan.  Africa has become the global center for terrorism.

 

Nigeria has the largest population in Africa. Nigeria's population is doubling every twenty years.  By 2050, Nigeria will have more people than the United States.  The US can't abandon Nigeria.

 

The accompanying Options Paper proposes several ways to conduct training of Nigerians to conduct well-organized, disciplined, credible investigations of massacres by Fulani jihadists, Boko Haram, and ISWAP in Nigeria.  It also proposes ways to empower existing Nigerian churches to warn, police, and counter this genocidal terrorism.




U.S. Options for Investigating and Preventing Massacres in Nigeria

By Greg Stanton, Genocide Watch

 

This paper will propose U.S. options for investigating massacres in Nigeria, propose what organizations and people would carry out each option, estimate the costs, and give pros and cons for each option.  It will also propose options for creating ongoing surveillance networks to prevent future massacres.

 

1.     Organize and carry out training for Nigerian law enforcement investigators.

 

Law enforcement personnel from the Nigerian police, Nigerian armed forces, and Nigerian legal and political ministries will receive training in and practical experience in investigating massacres, conspiracy crimes, financial and logistical networks of terrorist groups.

 

They will receive training in:

Interviewing- with emphasis on victim/witness considerations;

Translation – with emphasis on accuracy without additions or translator opinions;

Evidence collection, with emphasis on evidence of human rights violations; 

Document collection;

Photography;

Exploitation of media (cell phones, computers); and

Chain of custody.

They will learn how to use EyeWitness, a powerful cellphone app developed by the International Bar Association to document crimes, with encrypted time stamped, GPS-ed images uploaded to a secure server in London.  This evidence preserves chain of custody and is now accepted in European courts.


US agencies, Nigerian human rights organizations, and ICON will train Nigerian law enforcement and government personnel about genocidal processes, early warning signs, and steps to prevent genocidal massacres. The trainees will receive education on warning signs of genocide and crimes against humanity, and how to prevent these crimes.

 

Organizations to carry out this training:

The FBI’s Human Rights Center, Global Training Unit, and Evidence Response Team and The Department of Homeland Security’s Human Rights Violators and War Crimes Center will conduct the training as part of the USG/USAID Democracy and Governance program in conjunction with the US Embassy and USAID in Abuja.

Nigerian government experts on terrorism, US military assistance personnel, and Nigerian NGO’s will also be consulted and involved in planning and training.

 

Estimated Costs: budget to be provided by the FBI and Homeland Security, the US Embassy and USAID in Abuja and Washington.  Costs: $ 5 million program costs. $ 1 million travel, lodging, and per diem for trainers and trainees.

 

Management:  By the Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Bureau (DRL) in the US Department of State and an interagency working group at State and the USAID Democracy and Governance program.

An existing DRL officer with experience in Africa and interagency work could coordinate USG participation. A Program Coordinator will be hired by DRL to coordinate this program.  A USAID contractor will be hired to go to Nigeria to work with USAID and set up the training.

 

Source of Funding: US Department of State DRL and USAID Democracy and Governance. Salaries for USG trainers will be paid by their respective government bureaus.

 

Pros:

·       This program will train Nigerians to enforce their own laws against terrorism.

·       It will help to create a network of Nigerians who will work to end jihadist massacres.

Cons:

·       Unless this option is accompanied by Option 2, Nigerians trained in this program will not join and receive support from a special cadre of investigators and law enforcement personnel devoted to countering genocidal terrorism, and to facilitating arrests and prosecutions of perpetrators.

·       This training cannot overcome collusion that may exist between Nigerian government officials, Nigerian armed forces officers, Fulani businessmen and arms dealers, and Fulani militias.

·       The program must be added to the budgets of State and USAID, both of which will resist the additions.




2.     Support a Nigerian Strike Force to investigate and prosecute genocidal massacres.

 

Using carefully chosen personnel from Nigerian government agencies who have been trained in Option 1, help the Nigerian government set up a Strike Force to investigate and prosecute genocidal massacres by Fulani jihadists, Boko Haram, and ISIS in West Africa.

 

Embed American experts with the Strike Force who will oversee all expenditures of US aid, provide continuing training, and provide organizational assistance for the work of the Strike Force for three years.

 

Organizations to organize and support this Strike Force:

Dedicated, honest law enforcement leaders should be chosen by the Nigerian government with advice of US FBI agents to organize this Strike Force.  The Strike Force should be a cadre of carefully recruited, highly disciplined Untouchables, like the people who make up our own FBI and Department of Homeland Security.  Members should be well paid and under constant surveillance. Corruption will mean immediate dismissal.


Special care must be taken to secure the Strike Force against infiltration by jihadist sympathizers and to protect all communications with advanced encryption and cybersecurity. Strike Force personnel will need firearms training and dedicated armed protection, especially during investigations.

 

US agencies that will help set up this Strike Force should include the FBI, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, State Department, and USAID, working as an interagency team. USG personnel or contractors experienced in work with African governments, particularly in Nigeria, should be chosen to be embedded with this Strike Force for three years.

 

Estimated costs:  Over $10 million per year for three years.  Budget to be calculated by FBI, Homeland Security, Justice Department, State Department, and USAID program budget planning experts, in conjunction with US Embassy and USAID Abuja.

 

Embedded US advisors to the Strike Force will be paid from the budgets of their contributing agencies in the USG. Those agencies could be reimbursed from a special State Dept/USAID budget for this program.

 

Management: By dedicated program managers from USG entities like USAID, the FBI, Homeland Security, or the Department of Justice, or by contracting organizations approved for USAID programs.

 

Source of Funding:  Department of State DRL; USAID

 

Pros:

·       This Strike Force will build a specialized Nigerian action institution to investigate, arrest, and prosecute Fulani jihadists and other terrorists.

·       It will be independent of local police and prosecutors, who are often corrupt or cowardly.

·       If the President creates it, it could carry the political will necessary to bring perpetrators to justice.

·       If it is adequately funded and has excellent technical assistance, it could utilize connections with the FBI, Homeland Security, Interpol, US and EU Treasury Departments, and with arms control agencies for investigations of financial and arms networks.

 

Cons:

·       If the Strike Force finds evidence of Nigerian government complicity with jihadist massacres, the Strike Force could be quickly shut down.

·       The Nigerian government needs to take ownership of the Strike Force and be willing to fund it. Without strong Nigerian ownership, the Strike Force will accomplish little and soon die.

·       If corruption invades the Strike Force, it could become another instrument of police oppression.

·       The composition and leadership of the Strike Force will be subject to the same ethnic rivalries that pervade all Nigerian governmental institutions.

 

 

 

 

3.     Lobby President Tinubu, Nigerian Army leaders, and police to prevent Fulani jihadist massacres.

 

Through purposeful diplomacy, the US Embassy and allied European and African embassies could lobby President Tinubu and the Nigerian government to crack down and stop massacres by Fulani militias.  The US could offer Options 1 and 2 as direct assistance to the Nigerian government in this campaign.

 

The US and its allies could also use negative legal pressure such as the Global Magnitsky Act, visa bans, freezing of bank accounts of corrupt Nigerian officials, and other targeted sanctions to provide incentives for much more aggressive prevention of massacres and other crimes against humanity.

 

Organizations to lobby the Nigerian government: US Embassy, Abuja. Counter-Boko Haram/ISIS-WA Field Rep Embassy Abuja; Allied embassies, especially the British embassy.  US military advisors to the Nigerian armed forces.  British military advisors.  Major oil companies that worked with President Tinubu.  Director of the FBI.  Assistant Secretary of State for DRL. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Other persons who know or could influence Tinubu.

 

Estimated costs: Flights, lodging, and expenses for USG officials to Nigeria. Costs of official visits to the US and UK for Tinubu and key Nigerian officials.  Rough estimate: $1 million plus flight costs.

 

Management: Washington DC: By Nigeria working group at US State Department, including DRL, African Affairs, Conflict and Stabilization Operations, Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, Office of Global Criminal Justice, Office of International Religious Freedom, Bureau of Counterterrorism, others.

 

Abuja, Nigeria: Counter-Boko Haram/ISIS-WA Field Rep Embassy Abuja, Working group appointed by the US Ambassador.

 

Source of Funding: To be determined by State Department budget experts.

 

Pros:

·       This option uses diplomatic persuasion and pressure to engage the Nigerian government in actively stopping the Fulani jihadi and other terrorist massacres.

·       It will build stronger relations with Nigeria, Africa’s most important country.

·       It recognizes that Nigeria must solve its own problems.  No other nation or organization can.

 

Cons:

·       If President Tinubu or powerful Nigerian Army officers are aiding Fulani militias, this project will fail.

·       Even if the Nigerian government becomes more engaged, its own military has committed massacres and brutal oppression in the campaign against Boko Haram.

·       The Nigerian military is dominated by officers from the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups. They may be unwilling to crush militants from their own groups.


 

 

4.     Train Nigerian church leaders in human rights documentation. Establish Human Rights Centers in existing church facilities.

 

Ask existing Nigerian church groups to select key leaders to be trained in human rights documentation. Set up and operate Human Rights Centers in existing Nigerian churches where people will be trained in human rights documentation. The centers will also provide secure maintenance of records of massacres and other human rights violations.

 

Some of the subjects for training are those listed in Option 1 for Nigerian law enforcement investigators.

However, most trainees would be ordinary people, not law enforcement officers.  The training would be at a more basic level.

 

The models for this program are the human rights documentation programs conducted by Saint Óscar Romero of the Roman Catholic Church in El Salvador and the UN sponsored Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala.

 

Following training, the Human Rights Center personnel would document all cases of massacres, disappearances, torture, and other crimes against humanity.  The records would be kept as secure physical records protected from destruction.   They would also be scanned and sent to secure digital storage.

 

Organizations to Establish these human rights training and documentation centers:

The Christian Association of Nigeria, an umbrella organization of the Catholic, mainline Protestant, and Pentecostal churches.  The Roman Catholic church has a strong Nigerian organization.  It might provide the broadest base for these Human Rights Centers. Nigerian church leaders would provide a list of denominations that should be part of this human rights center program.

 

Many of the organizers and leaders of Human Rights Centers would be pastors and priests of churches.

 

Estimated costs: Nigerian churches should provide the buildings, equipment, and personnel for these centers.  American churches would be asked to contribute funds to equip these Human Rights Centers.

 

The US government and US religious organizations could provide trainers to train Nigerians to educate church leaders, investigators, and reporters to monitor human rights violations, and report warning signs of impending massacres promptly to church leaders and Nigerian police and armed forces, as well as to villagers in danger. 

 

Management:

This project would be managed by American and Nigerian religious organizations and human rights organizations.  With convening support from churches, a coalition would be organized to establish and fund the work of these Human Rights Centers.

 

Source of Funding:  American churches, organized through existing church hierarchies.

 

Pros:

·       This program would be funded by American churches, so it would be independent of both the American and Nigerian governments.

·       It would use already existing church buildings, church pastors and priests, and church members.

·       It would mobilize Nigerian Christians for early warning and self-defense against massacres.

·       Because this option uses the extraordinary grass-roots penetration of churches, it would be best equipped to listen for early warnings and report them to armed authorities.

 

Cons:

·       Churches should not be organizations for armed resistance to Fulani militias.  That is a state and police function.

·       Churches must be limited to collection of intelligence about potential attacks.

·       Christian churches would not support military training for their members.

·       Churches cannot become armories for storage of weapons.

·       Fulani militias must be defeated by village self-defense forces, not by armed church groups.



Copyright 2024 Genocide Watch Published by Genocide Watch with Creative Commons licensing rules: Free to republish with credit to Genocide Watch and without alteration of meaning or substance.

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